1846 and All That:The Rise and Fall of British Wheat Protection in the Nineteenth Century by Sharp, Paul Richard
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
1846 and All That
Sharp, Paul Richard
Publication date:
2006
Document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (APA):
Sharp, P. R. (2006). 1846 and All That: The Rise and Fall of British Wheat Protection in the Nineteenth Century.
Cph.: Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen.
Download date: 02. Feb. 2020
DISCUSSION PAPERS 
Department of Economics 
University of Copenhagen 
 
 
 
 
06-14 
 
 
1846 and All That:  
The Rise and Fall of British Wheat  
Protection in the Nineteenth Century 
 
Paul Sharp 
 
 
 
 
Studiestræde 6, DK-1455 Copenhagen K., Denmark 
Tel. +45 35 32 30 82 - Fax +45 35 32 30 00 
http://www.econ.ku.dk 
 
 
1846 and All That 
The Rise and Fall of British Wheat Protection in the 
Nineteenth Century 
 
Abstract: By documenting the legislative history of the Corn Laws from 1670 and using 
previously unused data to calculate annual Ad Valorem Equivalents for most years from 1814, 
it is possible to establish several important facts about British wheat protection. Statutory 
protection was only significant for a few years after 1815, the decline starting in the 1820s 
and continuing beyond the famous “repeal” in 1846. The level of protection prior to 1846 
was, for many years, much lower than previous accounts have suggested. The annual time 
series of Ad Valorem Equivalents will allow for UK trade policy to play the important role it 
deserves in econometric analyses of the nineteenth century. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paul Sharp 
paul.sharp@econ.ku.dk 
Department of Economics 
University of Copenhagen 
 1
1. Introduction 
It is now three-quarters of a century since the publication of 1066 and All That. The authors 
ridiculed the historian’s fixation with “memorable dates”, although this enthusiasm even now 
seems little diminished. For the economic historian few dates in the nineteenth century are 
more memorable than 1846. 
The repeal of the British Corn Laws is one of the nineteenth century’s most famous 
political episodes concerning economic policy. As such it has attracted the attention of 
historians of British politics, who have revelled in the cut and thrust of the political debate of 
the time, and that of economic historians: see for example the articles in Harley (1996) and 
Schonhardt-Bailey (1997). 
Recently, there has been renewed interest in the Corn Laws. The late twentieth century 
phenomenon of “globalization” has led economic historians to demonstrate that this process 
actually occurred in two phases. The beginning of globalization has been placed in the late 
nineteenth century, the process being interrupted and severely set back during the interwar 
years, only to experience a second wave after the Second World War (O’Rourke & 
Williamson, 1999). The trade liberalization exemplified by the repeal of the Corn Laws was 
of course a necessary precursor for this. 
The true economic significance of the nineteenth century Corn Laws has not been 
satisfactorily assessed, however. Two strands are discernable in the literature. The first 
presents the day to day functioning of the Corn Laws and/or the politics surrounding them; 
see for example Fay (1932), Barnes (1965) and Vamplew (1980). The second attempts to 
quantify the economic impact of the Corn Laws, for example through estimates of their ad 
valorem incidence. These, however, differ widely. For example, estimates for the pre-1842 
system have ranged from 5.6 per cent in McCloskey (1980) to 54 per cent in Williamson 
(1990). The reason for these discrepancies is their complexity: the Corn Laws were by no 
means a simple ad valorem tariff and it is easy to oversimplify when interpreting them as 
such. 
The workings of the Corn Laws are in fact recorded in great detail in British 
parliamentary papers. This information can be used to law to rest some of the conventional 
historical wisdom about the Corn Laws. Traditionalist accounts even today1 suggest that 1846 
was a dramatic break with the past, repealing age-old tariffs, inspiring other European 
countries and paving the way for an age of free trade in Europe and the first era of 
                                                 
1 See for example Schonhardt-Bailey (2006). 
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globalization, as exemplified by the American “grain invasion”. None of this is true. British 
grain protection was significant for just a few years after 1815 and the movement to free trade 
was a gradual process, starting in the 1820s, but only ending in 1869. 1846 was just one stage, 
albeit an important one, in this. 
This paper focuses on the tariffs on foreign wheat. Section 2 documents the legislative 
history of the Corn Laws from the seventeenth century, showing the rise in protection up to 
1815 and the subsequent fall. Section 3 first gives a critical summary of previous attempts to 
assess the incidence of the Corn Laws in the nineteenth century, and then utilizes previously 
unused data from British parliamentary papers to provide an alternative account. In particular, 
this is done by compiling an annual time series of Ad Valorem Equivalents (AVEs) from 
1828, which give an impression of the rise and fall of British wheat protection after this date. 
These estimates will be useful for economic historians and econometricians investigating the 
history of trade in wheat and the extent of market integration in the nineteenth century. 
Section 4 suggests some implications from these findings. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The Legislative History 
2.1 The Rise of Protection 
It is impossible to understand the significance of the movement towards repeal without first 
understanding the historical background for the Corn Laws. Many accounts give the 
impression of a protectionist order steeped in history, but the reality is rather different. The 
rise of trade barriers for the sake of protectionism was a nineteenth century phenomenon. It 
happened suddenly in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars and represented a significant 
break with the past. 
As Nicholson (1904, p. iii) and others have noted, the Corn Laws have come to be seen 
as principally protective measures governing imports. However, for much of their history the 
import duties were a very minor part, although they assumed greater and greater importance. 
Neither was wheat the only grain legislated for, but it was certainly the most important in 
terms of the volume of imports and consumption. Indeed, Barnes (1965) documents the 
extraordinary attachment of the ordinary English populace to white wheat bread. At times of 
scarcity, the authorities would attempt to encourage the substitution of other grains, even by 
example, but to no avail, in an interesting parallel to present day government attempts to 
influence diet. 
After the repeal of an old and inoperative law of 1463 there was no statutory restriction 
on importation until the Corn Law of 1660. (Barnes 1965, p. 6) From 1670 until 1815 there 
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was little change in the basic format of the laws governing imports. With a basis in medieval 
ethical thinking, the Laws attempted to secure for both the consumer and the producer a “just 
price” (Nicholson 1904, p. 63). In times of poor harvests and high prices, consumers were 
protected by low import duties. In times of surplus and low prices, producers would be 
protected by “bounties”, i.e. subsidies, on exports. 
Price bands were specified within which certain duties would be payable. A common 
feature after 1670 is a very small “nominal” duty payable when the price of wheat was high 
(normally about 1s. per quarter), and a “pivot level” below which duties were very high. 
These bands and duties were adjusted at various times, and extra levels, above and below the 
aforementioned were sometimes in effect, but in practice they had little impact on imports 
which were very low, and at times of scarcity they were suspended. The importance of the 
duties was as a counterpart to the system of export bounties2. Without the wheat duty, it 
would have been profitable to import in order to re-export and collect the bounty. (Fay 1932, 
p. 15)  
The import restrictions only began to have large practical relevance from the late 1780s, 
when a combination of the effects of the industrial revolution and population growth led to 
England becoming a net importer of wheat on a permanent basis (Fay 1932, p. 28). 1792 was 
the last year when England was a net exporter. 
At first, this change appears to have led to an early movement towards free trade, 
perhaps with a basis in the ideas of the Scottish enlightenment. The preamble to the Corn Law 
of 1774 stated that “Whereas it had been found by experience that the restraints laid by 
several statutes upon the dealing in corn, flour, meal, cattle, and other sundry sort of victuals, 
by preventing a free trade in the said commodities, have a tendency to discourage the growth 
and to enhance the price of the same”. (Nicholson 1904, p. 82) This Law saw a considerable 
reduction of the pivot level, from 82.5s. to 49.5s. per quarter and came on top of the 
introduction of preferential rates for colonies from 1766 (Nicholson 1904, p. 39). 
Corn Laws from 1791 steadily increased both the pivot level and the duty payable. 
However, almost constant wars with France from 1792 until Waterloo in 1815 meant that the 
Corn Laws became irrelevant, as prices rose to such a level that only the (very small) lowest 
rate of duty was payable for most of the time. In sum, the period from 1774 to 1815 was one 
of “practically free” trade in corn, as stated in the report of an 1821 select committee. (Fay 
1932, p. 80)  
                                                 
2 Although these were rarely payable after 1773 (Fay 1932, p. 31), and they were abolished in 1814. 
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With peace in 1815 a new law was passed which prohibited wheat imports when prices 
were under 82.5s. and admitted wheat free of duty above this level. This was a radical 
departure from previous Corn Laws. Fay has described the 1815 Law as “the one and only 
serious breach in corn-law policy from beginning to end” and “defiantly protective” (Fay 
1932, p. 35) Barnes (1965) has suggested that it reflected a new antagonism between the 
classes after the French Revolution. 
Figure 1 serves to illustrate the impact of the Corn Laws prior to these dates. The graph 
plots the annual average price of wheat against the level above which small “nominal” duties 
were payable, and the pivot level, below which duties were high3. The price data is the 
Gazette series from 1771 and is the “Winchester College” series before this date. 
Figure 1: The Corn Laws 1670-1827
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Source: Mitchell & Deane (1962), BPP (1843) 
The graph demonstrates that it is possible to divide the Corn Laws before 1815 into 
three regimes. Before 1774 the Corn Laws appear highly protectionist, with the average 
annual price only rarely exceeding the pivot level and never implying nominal duties. 
However, as Fay (1932, p. 15) notes, the only times when the price was high enough to justify 
the second highest band, the import duties were suspended, and besides, England was a net 
                                                 
3 For some years my definition of the pivot level includes two bands. 
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exporter of corn for most of these years. In Nicholson’s (1904, p. 70) words, the duties on 
import until 1773 were “practically inoperative, though nominally prohibitive”.  
From 1774-1791 there is a clear movement towards free trade, but starting in 1791 and 
culminating in the Law of 1815 there is a gradual reversal, although high grain prices during 
the wars meant that in practice the Laws were inoperative. For some years the protection 
afforded by the Corn Laws might even have been negative, since in 1794-5 neutral ships 
bound for France were seized and from 1795-6 and from 1800-1 imports were bountied, i.e. a 
subsidy was paid on import. (Fay 1932, p. 37) 
In 1815 the graph illustrates dramatically the protectionist tendency of the new law, and 
of course by this time a price below the pivot level did not just imply a high tariff, but rather 
prohibition. With one notable exception from November 1816 to November 1817, ports were 
almost permanently closed from the passing of the Act until 18254. (Fay 1932, p. 79) 
2.2 The Fall of Protection 
Although the UK turned protectionist in 1815, this was immediately met by protests, 
including a formal Protest in the House of Lords, signed by eleven peers including two royal 
dukes, and this opposition continued, amongst other things resulting in the famous “Petition 
of the London Merchants” in 1820 drafted by Tooke (McCord 1970). 
New legislation followed the protests. Protection was ostensibly relaxed by a new Act 
in 1822, but this was only to come into operation “as soon as wheat should be again 
admissible for consumption, under the Act of 1815” (BPP 1843).  Since these terms were 
never met (except for colonial corn), this Act never came into force. However, in 1825, 1826 
and 1827 a series of temporary Acts allowed some wheat to be released from bond for a short 
period of the year, although these applied only to grain that had been imported prior to the 
passing of each Act5. The 1815 Act was permanently repealed in 1828 when the import 
prohibition was dropped in favour of the Duke of Wellington’s “sliding scale” of import 
duties. 
For most of the 1830s domestic harvests were plentiful, prices were low and discussion 
of the Corn Laws was muted. However, from 1837 prices began to rise and in 1838 the 
famous Anti-Corn Law League6, led by Richard Cobden and John Bright, began to campaign 
                                                 
4 Ports were also open for a few months in 1818 and 1819. 
5 Schlote (1952, p. 112) states that “imports” (i.e. releasing wheat from bond) were prohibited from May 15, 
1825 to July 14, 1828. This is not strictly true. 
6 It has been suggested that the League’s motives were wider than a simple reaction to the rise in prices. See 
McCord (1968). 
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for free trade in grain7. In 1842 an attempt was made to ease the degree of protection, but poor 
harvests and the Irish Potato Famine caused political disarray which finally led to the repeal 
of 1846, when duties were greatly reduced together with a promise that only a “nominal” 
registration duty would be payable from 1849. (Tracy 1989, pp. 39-40)8 
The Acts from 1828 are complicated and scholars have contradicted each other when 
documenting them9. The account below is based on contemporary parliamentary papers and 
for simplicity only documents the measures concerning foreign wheat; colonial wheat was 
given favourable rates until 1849, but was a very small proportion of imports. 
Again, it is important to emphasise that the Corn Laws were not a simple ad valorem 
tariff. From 1828 to 1849, they involved a complicated “sliding scale”, whereby certain price 
ranges would imply a particular duty on “wheat entered for home consumption”. This was a 
throw back to the years prior to 1815, when duties were also payable according to what can be 
seen as a miniature sliding scale. The rate of duty payable was recalculated on a weekly basis. 
Until 1849 there was no import duty on wheat as such; grain could be imported freely, and 
then placed in “bonded warehouses”. It was only on release from “bond”, i.e. “entered for 
home consumption”, that the duty was payable.  
The price determining the duty was an average of wheat prices recorded for a varying 
number of “inspected markets” (varying depending on the current Act governing the Laws). 
An average was taken of these prices: this is the famous “Gazette” price – so called because it 
was (and still is) recorded weekly in the Gazette newspaper. In determining the price relevant 
for the duty for each week, the average of the last six weeks’ Gazette prices was calculated. 
The duties payable under the various tariff regimes are shown in table 1. 
                                                 
7 This raises the question as to whether Williamson (1990, p. 130) seeks to answer the wrong question: “What 
was the impact of the Corn Laws in the mid-1830s when the Corn Law debates rose to a crescendo?” The mid-
1840s are far more interesting in this respect. 
8 For a more detailed account of the politics of repeal, see Barnes (1965). 
9 That is not to say that contemporaries were more enlightened, as the following exchange from the 
parliamentary debates between the Conservative Prime Minister Peel and the Whig leader of the opposition 
shows: 
Sir R. Peel: …At present the House is aware, that the duty payable upon corn is levied in this manner. At 59s. 
and under 60s., the duty is 27s. diminishing 1s. with 1s. increase of price, until corn arrives at the price of 
between 66s. and 67s., when the duty is 20s. 8d. The duty then falls 2s. when corn is between 68s. and 69s. At 
69s. the duty is 16s. 
Lord J. Russell: Not exactly so. Between 69s. and 70s. the duty is 13s. 8d. 
Sir R. Peel: I am reading from a printed statement, and I believe it to be correct… 
[Quoted in Fay 1932, p. 173 – Lord Russell was correct!] 
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When the 
Gazette 
price 
was…
From 15 
July 1828 
to 29 April 
1842
From 29 
April 1842 
to 26 
June 
1846
From 26 
June 
1846 to 1 
February 
1849
From 1 
February 
1849 to 1 
June 
1869
73+ 1 1 4 1
72+ 2.67 2 4 1
71+ 6.67 3 4 1
70+ 10.67 4 4 1
69+ 13.67 5 4 1
68+ 16.67 6 4 1
67+ 18.67 7 4 1
66+ 20.67 8 4 1
65+ 21.67 9 4 1
64+ 22.67 10 4 1
63+ 23.67 11 4 1
62+ 24.67 12 4 1
61+ 25.67 13 4 1
60+ 26.67 14 4 1
59+ 27.67 15 4 1
58+ 28.67 16 4 1
57+ 29.67 17 4 1
56+ 30.67 18 4 1
55+ 31.67 19 4 1
54+ 32.67 20 4 1
53+ 33.67 20 4 1
52+ 34.67 20 5 1
51+ 35.67 20 6 1
50+ 36.67 20 7 1
49+ 37.67 20 8 1
48+ 38.67 20 9 1
47+ 39.67 20 10 1
+1 for 
every 
shilling 
decrease 
in price
20 was 
the 
maximum 
payable
10 was 
the 
maximum 
payable
Fixed rate 
of duty
Table 1: The Corn Laws 1828-1869
All prices in shillings per imperial quarter
… the duty payable was…
 
A point to note about the 1828 Law is the non-linearity. Above 66 s. the duty fell away 
very rapidly. The table demonstrates clearly the legislative progress towards free trade from 
1828. Duties were decreased in 1842, 1846 and 1849. 
Interestingly, although 1846 is popularly considered to mark the “repeal” of the Corn 
Laws, duties on grain survived for many years afterwards, and it certainly did not mark an era 
of “free trade in grain”. (Williamson 1990, p. 125) From June 26, 1846 to January 31, 1849 
the sliding scale was to continue in a truncated state, although duties were suspended from 
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January 26, 1847 to March 1, 184810. Shortly afterwards under the terms of the 1846 Act, the 
sliding scale was abolished altogether: from February 1, 1849 a fixed “nominal registration 
duty” of 1s. per quarter was in effect11. In addition, an Act of August 1, 1849 ended the 
practice of “warehousing” by making the duty payable on import. (Prest 1996, p. 474) 
Prest (1996) has shown that the registration duty was anything but “nominal”, at least in 
revenue terms: because of the rapid growth of trade after 1849, the registration duty earned 
the British state an average of £629,602 per annum – far higher than under the sliding scales. 
As he says, “whoever gained from the repeal of the corn laws, the revenue did not lose”. 
(Prest 1996, p. 474) With the growing realization, documented by Prest, that the registration 
duty amounted to a significant tax on the poorest in society, it was finally repealed on June 1, 
1869, leading to true free trade in grain, although it was briefly re-imposed in order to pay for 
the Boer War from April 15, 1902 to June 30, 1903. (Annual Statement, 1903) Wheat then 
remained duty free until the Wheat Act of May 1932. (Malembaum 1953, p. 35) 
The obvious point to be taken from this is that, despite the imposition of the 1815 Act, 
already from 1822 there were legislative movements towards free trade, which came to a 
conclusion in 1869. 
2.3 Some preliminary conclusions 
The traditional account of the movement towards free trade and the first era of globalization 
in Europe sees Britain playing a leading role, first repealing the Corn Laws in 1846 and then 
negotiating the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty with France in 1860. According to this story, other 
countries learned from Britain’s experience and, belatedly, followed suit. This account has 
come under increasing attack, for example by Nye (1991) who suggests that French protection 
was consistently below that of Britain for most of the nineteenth century, and most recently 
by Accominotti & Flandreau (2006). In particular, they question the significance of another 
memorable date, 1860 and the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty. This included a Most Favoured 
Nation clause in trade agreements between Britain and France12, but, they suggest, was of 
little practical importance, since European trade was already more-or-less free by this time. 
They also find that “Britain’s trade liberalization after the repeal of the Corn Laws was typical 
rather than exceptional” and that continental countries adopted trade liberalization before 
                                                 
10 Schlote (1952) gives the last date as September 1, 1847, but contemporary sources (for example Tables of 
Revenue (1847) give the date as March 1, 1848.  This also seems more likely, given the very small level of tariff 
revenue reported for 1847, see table 3, below. 
11 From September 1, 1864 duties were calculated and imports measured based on weight (cwt.) rather than 
volume (quarters). So technically from this date the registration duty was 3d. per cwt., but this is approximately 
the same as 1s. per quarter. (Annual Statement, 1864) 
12 This was no innovation. The Anglo-French Treaty of 1786 included the same concept. (McCord 1970, p. 40) 
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1846. Thus they conclude that Britain cannot have been the inspiration for the movement to 
free trade that she has been assumed to be.  
It is, however, surprising how much can be learned from a simple account of the 
legislative process leading to repeal. The movement away from the protection of 1815 was 
gradual, starting with the temporary laws from 1825-7, and it was most importantly and 
permanently reversed in 1828. So, although this paper cannot attempt to resolve the debate as 
to which country led the way to free trade, which would require a far more general survey, it 
does provide some interesting evidence as far as the important trade in wheat is concerned. 
Here Britain’s example was set in the 1820s, not the 1840s13. In the context of previous 
history, the “repeal” in 1846 seems less important, and simply another step in a progress 
toward free trade after the reversal of 1815. Indeed, 1846 did not even mark the end of British 
wheat protection, which only finally gave way to true free trade in 1869. 
The traditional argument might therefore have more validity than recent accounts 
suggest. This is of course the oft-neglected but important point to be taken from Williamson 
(1990), who demonstrated the steady decline in protection from 1815, and more recently, 
from O’Rourke & Williamson (2005, p. 14), who find that “by 1838 there had already been a 
radical liberalization of British commercial policy, and Britain stuck with that pro-
globalization stance up to the more famous 1846 Repeal of the Corn Laws and beyond”. The 
reason for the importance of 1838 will be revealed in section 4. 
What a simple history of the tariff legislation does not answer, however, is how 
important the statutory protection after 1828 was. At the extremes of the sliding scales, the 
UK market was either practically closed or as open as under the nominal duty of 1849. 
Several attempts have been made to assess this question as will be discussed in the next 
section. All rely on the calculation of so-called “Ad Valorem Equivalents”. 
3. The incidence of the Corn Laws in the nineteenth century 
3.1 Ad Valorem Equivalents 
In order to compare the impact of the various Corn Law regimes, it can be helpful to convert 
the statutory tariffs to so-called Ad Valorem Equivalents (AVEs). An ad valorem tariff is one 
that is a fixed percentage of the value of the imported commodity. So ( )1P t P= + , where 
                                                 
13 This was not only in terms of grain. Britain’s nineteenth century commitment to a process of trade 
liberalization can be dated to at least 1820, when parliament, which at that time included David Ricardo as an 
MP, declared that future commercial policy should be guided by the principle of free trade (Grampp 1987). In 
fact, by the 1840s “the Corn Laws stood out as the major remaining bastion of Protection, while tariffs on other 
imports had been very substantially diminished” (McCord 1970, p. 10). 
 10
0t ≥  is the tariff rate, P is the price payable by the domestic consumer and P  is the value of 
the imported commodity. The Corn Laws were, however, a specific, rather than an ad 
valorem tariff. 
A specific tariff is one which charges a specific duty per non-monetary unit of a good. 
The Corn Laws first charged per unit of volume (quarter) and from 1864 per unit of weight 
(hundredweight). Obviously the information requirements for imposing a specific duty are 
rather less from those for an ad valorem duty – the good only needs to be weighed, measured 
or counted to determine the duty. For an ad valorem tariff, the good also needs to be valued. 
When converting specific tariffs it is thus necessary to value the product. This could be 
based on the domestic price, the world price, or something in between. There is no standard 
way of calculating these so-called AVEs and in fact the recent WTO Doha round broke down 
over this very issue, although “Draft guidelines” were accepted by negotiators on May 4, 
200514. (Economist, May 5, 2005) 
There are two generally accepted approaches. The first is the “unit price” method, 
whereby a specific duty is compared to a reference price. The other is the “revenue method”: 
total tax revenue over a period compared to the total value of imports over the same period. 
The two methods are actually equivalent, since 
 *
*
D D QAVE
P P Q
= = , (1) 
where D is the monetary value of the duty collected per unit of imports and P is the import 
unit value. So D P  is the unit value expression of the AVE. Multiplying by Q, the quantity of 
imports, in the numerator and the denominator gives the revenue method expression of the 
AVE, since D*Q is total duty revenue and P*Q is the total value of imports. 
The problem remains of how to value the imports and this matter will be returned to 
later in this paper. Ideally, given the definition of an ad valorem duty, imports should be 
valued at the counterfactual price that would apply under free trade, which would be the c.i.f. 
price of imports. This is, however, not normally known and previous attempts at calculating 
the ad valorem equivalent of the Corn Laws can be seen as ways of trying to get around this 
problem. 
One popular solution is to calculate estimates based on the price differential between 
UK wheat and a representative foreign exporting country (Prussia). This approach relies on 
the efficient operation of the Law of One Price and thus the strong assumption of perfect 
                                                 
14 AVEs would allow countries to “tier” their tariffs and thus allow for a “progressive” reduction in tariffs, i.e. 
high tariffs should be reduced more. 
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market integration. The former states that the price of a traded good, adjusted for trading 
costs, such as transportation and tariffs, will be equal in two markets due to the possibility of 
arbitrage: 
 ( )(1 ) *P t P τ= + + , (2) 
where P  is the price of the good in the home importing market, which is a mark-up on the 
foreign price, P*, including the cost of the tariff (expressed as an AVE), t, and other non-tariff 
barriers, τ , such as transportation costs.  From this we can calculate the home price with free 
trade as 
 *FTP P τ= +  (3) 
since 0t = . 
Using this, we can solve for the extent of the ad valorem equivalent of a tariff, t, as 
follows: 
 ( )*
*
FT
FT
P P P PAVE t
P P
τ
τ
− + −= = =+ , (4) 
where the numerator is the part of the price differential due to the tariff and the denominator is 
the free trade domestic price. The ad valorem tariff is simply the proportion of the price 
attributable to the tariff. However, although P is observable, FTP  is not, because normally we 
do not know how much of the price differential *P P−  is due to non-tariff barriers. 
3.2 Previous estimates 
An obvious and simple way of estimating the impact of the Corn Laws on an annual basis is 
to use the unit price method employed by Schlote (1953, p.61). He takes the average yearly 
Gazette price of wheat and uses the sliding scale to calculate what the tariff would have been 
at that price. That is 
 ( )t tt
t
D P
AVE
P
= , (5) 
where ( )t tD P  is the duty payable from the relevant sliding scale at time t, which is a function 
of the price at time t. 
He then reports the tariff as a percentage of the price for selected years from 1829 to 
1848. Completing his time series gives the picture in figure 3.15 However, although Schlote’s 
method seems intuitively correct, it tends to flatten the true variation in the ad valorem 
                                                 
15 The duty for 1828-41 is calculated using the 1828 sliding scale. The duty for 1842-5 is calculated using the 
1842 sliding scale. The duty for 1846-48 is calculated using the 1846 sliding scale. From 1849 the duty used is 
1s. per quarter. 
 12
incidence of the Corn Laws between the years. This is due to the workings of the Corn Laws 
under the sliding scale, as touched on above. Vamplew (1980) has shown that wheat was only 
normally released from the bonded warehouses when tariffs were at their lowest level during 
a year. Indeed, in most cases over 95 per cent of wheat was released at the lowest level of 
duty in each period of an up- or downswing in duties. 
Thus, to take one example, during the downswing in duties from week 5 to week 38 in 
1838, 1,306 quarters of wheat were released for home consumption, 96.6 per cent of this at a 
rate of 1s. per quarter. From week 39 to week 45 there was an upswing in duties, during 
which only 166 quarters were released. In the downswing from week 46 to week 13 in 1839 
100 per cent of the 996 quarters released for home consumption paid a duty of just 1s. per 
quarter.  Just looking at the average price for 1838 (64s.), as Schlote did, would imply a duty 
of 22.67s, or 35 per cent of the Gazette price. In reality, most wheat paid a duty of just 1s. per 
quarter: less than 2 per cent of the price. 
Thus it is that Schlote’s method yields unreliable estimates: very little grain was subject 
to duty at the highest rates and any estimate using the average price for the year to determine 
the implied duty will upwardly bias the estimates of the ad valorem incidence. 
The most widely cited estimates for the ad valorem incidence of the Corn Laws are 
those of Williamson (1990), given again by him again in O’Rourke & Williamson (1999, p. 
38 and pp. 83-4)16 and O’Rourke & Williamson (2005, p. 10). 
Williamson (1990) attempts to assess the ad valorem impact of the Corn Laws after 
1815 by first testing whether there is market integration between the UK and Prussia. If 
markets are well integrated “it would be a simple matter to infer the impact of the Corn Laws 
on home prices by measuring price differentials between British and foreign markets, 
adjusting for transport costs”. (p. 126)  
Williamson draws inspiration from Fairlie (1969), who divides the period 1815-68 into 
five periods: 1815-27, 1828-41, 1842-8, 1849-59 and 1860-8. She has a time series with an 
average yearly price of wheat in England and Wales and an average yearly price of wheat in 
Prussia. Both are taken from Fairlie (1965). She provides estimates of the “amount by which 
English prices would have been lower had there been free trade” by making seemingly ad hoc 
assumptions about the level of transport costs and terms of trade effects. This number can 
then be used (see Williamson 1990, p. 128) to give an estimate of the ad valorem impact of 
the tariff in each period. Williamson (1990, p.128n) suggests that Fairlie’s calculations 
                                                 
16 Here the figure for the 1842 regime is given incorrectly and should read 22 per cent rather than 7 per cent. 
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assume too strong a terms of trade assumption, although Ward (2004, p. 254) finds support 
for Fairlie’s assumption. 
Williamson’s solution is to run a simple regression of the English prices of wheat from 
1815-61 on the Prussian prices given in Fairlie (1965). Dummies are introduced for the three 
protectionist regimes, 1815-27, 1828-41 and 1842-45 and finally a trend is introduced “to 
reflect the possibility of changing transport costs or changing market efficiency”. (Williamson 
1990, p. 127) It is possible to use the dummy coefficients to calculate an estimate of the ad 
valorem protection afforded by the various Corn Law regimes. To see this, note that 
 ( )1 * *
*
t P P
AVE t
P
+ −= = , (6) 
where ( )1 *t P+  is the price that would prevail in England if there were no non-tariff costs 
under the Law of One Price. The coefficients to the dummies provide an estimate of 
( )1 * *t P P+ − , i.e. the increase in the English price due to the tariff. This divided by P* 
provides his estimate of t. 
Using the results from the regression and comparing with Fairlie’s calculations without 
the terms of trade effect (“Using Williamson’s assumption”), Williamson concludes that 
“[t]he preferred estimates… are quite close. They imply that the ad valorem equivalent tariff 
rate was about 71% between 1815 and 1827, about 54% between 1828 and 1841, and about 
22%17 between 1842 and 1845.” (Williamson 1990, p. 128) 
There are a number of problems with Williamson’s analysis; for example, there are 
some minor questions about the data.18 More importantly, however, interpreting his results 
presents difficulties. Williamson finds the constant to be insignificant. This means that it is 
difficult to accept his interpretation as any meaningful “estimate of transport costs and 
expenses”. Moreover, the trend is also insignificant, which using Williamson’s interpretation 
suggests that “there is no evidence of significant combined changes in market efficiency and 
transport costs over time”, but the three dummies act much like a trend, and it is surely 
difficult to separate the effects. 
                                                 
17 This is incorrectly cited as seven per cent in O’Rourke & Williamson (1999, p. 38). 
18 There is an error in the Prussian series. From 1816-27 this is taken from a contemporary article, Rawson 
(1842). The price for 1816 appears to have been transcribed incorrectly by Fairlie (58s. instead of 48s.) and no 
source is given for 1815. However, even correcting for this, it has not been able to reproduce Williamson’s 
estimates using the data he cites. Using the regression the figures, for 1815-27, 1828-41 and 1842-45 
respectively, are 74.8%, 59% and 24.8%. Using “Williamson’s assumption”, the figures are 63%, 50% and 23%. 
Even using Williamson’s regression coefficient for 1815-27, the estimate is 74.8% rather than 72.8%. This 
difference, as well as the reported average Prussian price of 34.47s. in his footnote 2, suggests that the 
differences between my results and his stem from discrepancies between his Prussian data for 1815-27 and that 
given in Fairlie (1965). The difference is of little importance for the results, however. 
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However, there is no escaping the main conclusion from Williamson’s regression: that 
the price gap was narrowing over time, and that successive tariff reductions almost certainly 
played a large part in this. The main criticism has to be, however, that it fails to provide any 
information on the swings in the protection from year to year. In fact, of course, the protection 
varied from week to week, so to state that the 1828 sliding scale was equivalent to a 54 per 
cent ad valorem tariff provides about as much information as quoting the average price for the 
period. As Capie (1983) notes, average rates for long periods must “be a great simplification”. 
Is it then possible to use price differentials to create annual estimates? As before, this 
will only be possible if markets are perfectly integrated and although Williamson’s regression 
provides evidence that this was fulfilled on average for the periods he looks at, there is 
evidence that for some years the tariff was so high that this was not the case. 
O’Rourke (1994)19 makes the point that the Corn Laws could have influenced UK grain 
prices in two ways. Either the tariff was so high that imports were excluded and prices were 
determined by domestic demand and supply, or grain entered Britain, and the Law of One 
Price held20. 
O’Rourke determines which scenario was relevant for each year by noting that both the 
Prussian price plus transport costs and the British price minus the tariff should both be equal 
to the free trade price of wheat in the UK if the law of one price holds, i.e. 
*FTP P P tτ= + = − . He finds this not to be the case from 1832 to 1837, and this in itself 
presents difficulties if the Law of One Price is to be used as the basis for calculating annual 
AVEs. 
However, there are a couple of problems with his method which if corrected for would 
reinforce this conclusion. First, the estimates O’Rourke uses for the transport costs (7.5s. from 
Fairlie and 10s. from Williamson) are not apparently based on any substantial evidence. The 
impact of this on his conclusions is unclear. More importantly, however, he uses Schlote’s 
method to calculate the average tariff payable for each year. This will overemphasize the 
tariffs with the implication that markets would appear more integrated than they would if a 
more representative tariff was used. 
In addition, the assumption of constant transportation costs is unlikely to be correct – 
cycles in transport costs are a well documented phenomenon (see for example North (1958) 
and Persson (2004)). Persson’s data show that the barrier to trade due to transportation costs 
                                                 
19 See also O’Rourke & Williamson (1999, p. 83) 
20 In fact, there was grain imported and released from bond in every year, but the level was very low, especially 
in the mid-1830s. 
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could easily fluctuate by a factor of two or three from year to year. This could be the reason 
why Williamson’s constant is insignificant in his aforementioned econometric analysis. Even 
ignoring this, there is still the problem, as suggested in section 3.1, that any estimates based 
on the Law of One Price must assume perfect market integration, i.e. that all other costs, 
except transportation costs, have been arbitraged away. There is nothing to suggest that 
markets were so efficient at this time. 
The conclusion must be that annual estimates based on the assumption that the Law of 
One Price held are not appropriate for every year. Another method is necessary.  
3.3 Annual estimates based on the revenue method 
The revenue method, i.e. ratios of tariff revenue to import values, has the advantage that it 
does not rely on an assumption of market integration or on trade with specific countries. It is 
also possible to use this method to create annual estimates which more accurately reflect the 
proportion of the price paid in duty than Schlote’s method. 
The revenue method is a commonly used approach, for example by Imlah (1958) and 
more recently by Nye (1991) for more general studies of this period. It is also the method 
recommended by Capie (1983, p. 7), who states that “[d]uties as a percentage of total imports 
overcome the serious problem of the conversion of specific duties… to ad valorem 
equivalents. And… since this was a time when prices of many commodities were falling 
sharply, they are therefore clearly an improvement on simply looking at legislative changes in 
protection.” In relation to the Corn Laws, we should therefore not necessarily expect to see a 
fall in the ad valorem incidence between the 1828 and 1842 regimes, since prices were falling 
and this would make it more likely that wheat was paying higher rates of duty. 
This approach has been extensively criticised, see for example Irwin (1993) and 
Estevadeordal (1997) and a detailed criticism is given in Board of Trade (1904, pp. 287-292). 
However, this is mostly directed towards its applicability as a comparative measure of 
protection between various countries and particularly when it is used as an average over many 
commodities. As a way of comparing the protection offered between different years for one 
commodity, it seems reasonable enough. Another common criticism is that it cannot account 
for prohibitive tariffs (Capie 1983, p. 7) – however, wheat was released from bond and 
imported in every year after 1828. 
McCloskey (1980) uses the revenue method to present three estimates: for 1841 (5.6%), 
for 1854 (1.5%) and for 1881 (0%). Her estimates have been dismissed by Williamson (1990, 
p. 128n), who notes the sizeable difference between McCloskey’s estimate of the average 
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tariff for 1841 (35 per cent) and, for example, that given for wheat – just 5.6 per cent. He 
explains that since “the fact that duties on wheat were at their lowest in 1841… the atypical 
low rates in 1841 can be ignored”. This is not, however, a general criticism of the method, but 
rather of taking 1841 as representative of the pre-1842 incidence. If it were possible to extend 
McCloskey’s analysis beyond her three data points, then a fuller picture would emerge. 
With data from British parliamentary papers this is in fact possible. The formula is 
simple enough: 
 ( )
( )
t
t
t
Duties collectedAVE
Value of imports
 =    (7) 
The duties collected in each year are available in official publications. “Value of imports”, 
however, presents some special difficulties. 
Until 1849 “imports” should be taken to mean foreign wheat released from bond, since 
colonial wheat was subject to different duties and the duty was only payable when the wheat 
was released from the warehouse. From 1850, imports can be taken to mean total imports of 
wheat, both foreign and colonial, since the duty was payable on import, and colonial wheat 
no-longer enjoyed preferential rates of duty. 
Data is available on volumes of the above for every year. The difficulty is then how to 
value it. McCloskey notes that the value of wheat imports is not reported prior to 185421, but 
this is not entirely accurate. From 1696 records of overseas trade began to be systematically 
collected. Goods were valued using “official values” which were based on the average prices 
in 1694 – but these are obviously of little use here since prices were undoubtedly rather 
different by the nineteenth century22. However, from 1854 the method was changed, so that 
actual current prices23, compiled by experts, were used each year. (For more detail, see 
Schlote 1952, section A). 
The best method for valuing wheat released from bond in the UK is the average 
domestic price, i.e. the Gazette price. This valuation has some other advantages. First, it 
allows the estimates to be directly comparable with Schlote’s, who also used the Gazette price 
in the denominator when calculating his AVEs. Second, this appears to have been the method 
used for valuing wheat after 1854 and thus makes my estimates consistent with those based 
on later valuations. That this is the case can be seen in figure 2, which compares valuations 
based on multiplying quantities with the Gazette price, and the official valuations from 1854. 
                                                 
21 She has one observation prior to this for 1841, which seems to have been taken from secondary literature. 
22 Schumpeter (1938, p. 32) disputes this common explanation of the official value, and argues that it varied until 
1725. This has little importance in the current context, however! 
23 These were, confusingly for the modern economist, referred to as “real values”. 
 17
The small differences could be due to discrepancies in the quantity data, which differs slightly 
depending on the source. 
Figure 2: A comparison of reported values of imports and values 
found by multiplying quantities by the Gazette price
(in £)
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 Source: See appendix 
This may or may not be an appropriate valuation from 1850 when the duty was payable 
on import. However, an alternative measure will make little difference when calculating the 
value of the imported wheat relative to duties collected, since the difference between the two 
alternative evaluations will be relatively small in comparison to the volume of imports and the 
relatively small amount of revenue collected. Besides, with virtual free trade after 1849 and 
market integration, the Gazette price could be expected to be equal to the c.i.f. price of 
imported wheat, which is presumably the basis for the official valuations. 
The revenue method is unfortunately not particularly helpful before 1828. The amount 
of duty received for years prior to 1828 is only given on wheat and flour combined in official 
statistics, and is entirely absent prior to 1814, since the records were destroyed in the Custom 
House fire of 181424. The information that does survive, and the AVE for each year, is 
however given in table 2. 
                                                 
24 A tragedy for the economic historian almost equivalent to the destruction of the Library of Alexandria! 
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[A] [B] [A*B] [C] [C/(A*B)]
Gazette 
Price 
(s./qr.)
Quantity 
admitted 
(quarters)
Value of 
"imports" 
(£)
Duty 
collected 
(£) AVE
1814 74.33 623086 2315803 31140 1%
1815 65.58 116382 381636 9411 2%
1816 78.50 225260 884146 0 N/A
1817 96.92 1023862 4961465 0 N/A
1818 86.25 1550606 6686988 0 N/A
1819 74.50 115697 430971 0 N/A
1820 67.83 1056 3582 0 N/A
1821 56.08 0 0 0 N/A
1822 44.58 0 0 0 N/A
1823 53.33 51 136 0 N/A
1824 63.92 914 2921 0 N/A
1825 68.50 399297 1367592 197519 14%
1826 58.67 287338 842858 170017 20%
1827 56.67 519268 1471259 591821 40%
1828 60.42 821794 2482503 67925 3%
Source: BPP (1849)
Table 2: AVEs 1814-1828 for Wheat and Wheat Flour
 
The duty collected in 1815 is presumably for the months prior to the passing of the new 
Law on March 23. The figures for 1814 and 1815 thus give a flavour of the low level of 
protection afforded by the Corn Laws during the Napoleonic Wars. From 1815 until the 
temporary Acts of 1825-7 no duty was collected. Wheat was either entered free of duty or 
prohibited. It is thus impossible to calculate AVEs for these years. The AVEs for 1825-7 are 
only applicable for the few months covered by the temporary Acts. Finally, the dramatic 
impact of 1828 is all too clear. 
From 1828, the estimates of the annual ad valorem equivalents of the duties on wheat 
are constructed as below, where tP  is as usual the Gazette price in year t. 
1828-1849: 
 ( )
( )
t
t
t t
Duties collectedAVE
Quantity released from bond P
 =    ∗ ,  (8) 
where all values are for foreign wheat only. 
1850- : 
 ( )
( )
t
t
t t
Duties collectedAVE
Quantity imported P
 =  ∗ ,  (9) 
where all values are for both foreign and colonial wheat. 
As admitted in the aforementioned WTO draft guidelines, “calculation of AVEs is not 
an exact science” and these estimates are no exception. They are, however, certainly an 
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improvement on previous attempts and must accurately capture the annual variation in the 
protection afforded. 
The results of these calculations are given in figure 3, where they are compared to the 
Schlote estimates. The periods of highest tariffs are unsurprisingly similar in both series. 
However, my estimates are of course consistently lower, and the difference between the 
highest and lowest ad valorem rates is exaggerated. It should be noted that the figure for 1828 
is only for the period after the introduction of the Duke of Wellington’s sliding scale, i.e. from 
July 15. Note also that the years of least protection before “repeal” were in 1828, 1838 and 
1841 as stated in contemporary sources (Williamson 1990, p. 128n). 
Figure 3: Comparison of Schlote's and Sharp's AVEs
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4. What can be learned from the new estimates 
The discussion of the legislative history in section 2 has demonstrated the movement away 
from protection after 1828. The annual AVEs can also be used to illustrate this, but present a 
rather different picture than the estimates of other scholars. This is demonstrated in the 
following table, where the averages for each of the three sliding scale regimes are given:  
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 Fairlie25 Williamson Schlote Sharp 
1828/9-41 20% 54% 51% 28%26 
1842-45 10%27 22% 36% 28% 
1846-48 4% N/A 9% 6% 
 
Initially, the most striking fact about these numbers is the variation between them. The 
differences between Schlote’s and Sharp’s estimates have already been explained. These are 
also directly comparable. Fairlie’s and Williamson’s estimates are also directly comparable, 
and the difference is of course due to Fairlie’s large terms of trade effect.  
The difference between Sharp’s and Williamson’s estimates will be accounted for by 
non-tariff barriers. Indeed, the workings of the Corn Laws themselves acted as a sort of non-
tariff barrier, since the uncertainty surrounding the duties payable on wheat in the medium 
term and the costs of warehousing wheat in bond would certainly have added to the direct 
measures of protection detailed above. 
An interesting conclusion to be drawn from the regime averages of the annual AVEs is 
that, even excluding 1828, it turns out that the average ad valorem impact of the Corn Laws 
did not fall after 1842 and in fact remained constant. Although scholars have hitherto assumed 
that the reduction in the duties payable must have given rise to a fall in protection, a fall in the 
domestic price of wheat meant that 1842 actually inaugurated a short period of high 
protection, compared to other years since 1838. This previously undocumented fact has 
important implications for historians of British politics: it sheds light on the urgency 
surrounding the debate on the repeal of the Corn Laws after 1842, despite the reform of the 
sliding scale. 
For the true value of the annual AVEs, however, it is necessary to look beyond the 
regime averages. For the first time, the variation in the protection afforded by the Corn Laws 
from year to year, as recognized by Vamplew, has been documented. It turns out that the 
statutory protection varied quite substantially from year to year, reinforcing the point that any 
attempt to give an estimate for the whole period of a tariff regime is a gross 
oversimplification. For the same reason, a case could be made for saying that estimates based 
on yearly averages are also unsatisfactory, since duties varied on a weekly basis. However, for 
                                                 
25 These are recalculated using the relevant periods. 
26 The average for the first regime for Sharp’s AVE is calculated without the level for 1828, since this was only 
for part of a year. 
27 The sizeable difference between this estimate and that reported by Williamson (1990) of 7.4 per cent is due to 
him having used the figures reported in Fairlie (1969) for the period 1842-48, which includes years after the 
“Repeal”. 
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economic variables which were less important to the nineteenth century state, i.e. those not 
involved in raising revenue, the data is at most available in annual aggregates. So if import 
duties are to play the important role they deserve in empirical analyses of the nineteenth 
century, then they must be reported on an annual basis. 
In addition, an annual series is perhaps the most frequent that has practical relevance 
when estimating the impact on imports. Traders might be able to respond to the weekly level 
of the tariff (or at least the expected level), but they could not necessarily rely on a supply: 
farmers need much longer to form supply decisions. The only real test of the relevance of the 
annual AVEs is to compare them to the volume of foreign imports for each year. Vamplew 
noted that “imports did not respond as strongly as bonded corn to either domestic prices or 
duties. Although imports peaked at the times of lowest duties, there was a flow of wheat into 
the bonded warehouses throughout the year” (Vamplew 1980, p. 385). However, the new 
estimates fit in remarkably well with the data on levels of foreign imports28 after 1828. These 
are shown in figure 4. 
Figure 4: Imports of foreign wheat and AVEs 1829-1856
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Source: See appendix 
The causality can only be satisfactorily established by formal econometric testing. 
However, the evidence for the importance of the AVEs for import decisions is striking. First, 
it is difficult to imagine, had the 1828 regime really been equivalent to e.g. a flat 54 per cent 
                                                 
28 I.e. not wheat released from bond. 
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tariff rate, that imports would have reached the levels they did in the late 1830s and early 
1840s (and to a lesser extent from 1829-31) – levels comparable to those in the years 
immediately following repeal. Also, if we are prepared to accept Vamplew’s well-
documented assertion that grain merchants waited for periods of low duties before releasing 
their grain from bond, then it is not such a great leap of faith to believe that foreign grain 
exporters waited for years of low protection before sending grain to Britain. In fact, Vamplew 
noted that the official six-week average, together with time-lags in the regulatory process, 
meant that the duty was predictable: “A knowledge of market trends, which those involved in 
the corn trade should have had, ought to have made the prediction of the duty a fairly 
straightforward task. Holders and potential holders of foreign corn would thus be in a position 
to take action, if necessary, before the duty actually changed.” (Vamplew 1980, p. 384) It 
would thus be possible to arrange shipments of wheat to the UK in anticipation of a period of 
low duties. 
The graph also seems to present a solution to the seeming puzzle as to why O’Rourke & 
Williamson (2005, p. 14), when assessing the importance of trade policy for the timing of a 
structural break in the relationship between English commodity prices and English 
endowments, i.e. England’s change from a closed to an open economy, find 1838 to be the 
most likely candidate. Figure 4 makes clear that this year marks the end of significant wheat 
protection due to the Corn Laws, except for three years. Indeed, it is possible to see the tariff 
protection as prohibitive from 1815 until 1837 (with the exception of half of 1828, 1829, 1830 
and 1831) and low from 1838 (with the exception of just three years – 1843, 1844 and 1845). 
O’Rourke & Williamson note that 1838 also saw the start of the decline in the Harley freight 
index and the UK-US grain price gap. Of course the 1846 repeal was important, since it meant 
that the level of protection stayed permanently low, but the real break came in 1838 and 
imports clearly responded to that. 
In summary, then, it seems that the AVEs accurately reflect the rise and fall of wheat 
protection after 1828. They thus have an important role to play in analyses of the nineteenth 
century. The famous contention that the nineteenth century political debate about the Corn 
Laws was “much ado about nothing” (Kemp 1962, p. 189), a claim largely based on the fact 
that the “repeal” did not immediately lead to reduced cereal acreage in Britain29 can now be 
tested using annual data. Looking at imports, it seems that the level of protection was very 
important. At times of low duties imports reached levels not unlike those seen immediately 
                                                 
29 See the discussion in Williamson (1990), p. 129. 
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after repeal, although numerous other factors certainly also played a role. The impact of the 
Corn Laws on market integration can perhaps also now be analyzed. Definitive answers must 
await formal econometric testing. My estimates support the work of Capie (1983, p. 9), who 
concludes for a more general survey of protection and import ratios, that “protection was not 
as high or not as effective as usually supposed”, which is also the natural conclusion to be 
drawn from the work of Vamplew. 
5. Conclusion 
By focussing on 1846, historians have tended to ignore the legislative progress towards free 
trade before and after that date. This is mirrored by a fascination with the Anti-Corn Law 
League, an organization which was first founded in 1838 by which time the British market 
was already open! We should not forget that, amongst the peaceful protestors demonstrating 
for parliamentary reform attacked by the British military in the famous Peterloo Massacre of 
1819, were some holding banners proclaiming “No Corn Laws”. At this time Cobden was just 
a boy of 15. 
Through an analysis of the legislation and estimates of the ad valorem incidence, it is 
possible to establish several facts about British wheat protection under the Corn Laws. First, 
prohibitive tariffs were a nineteenth century phenomenon, and statutory protection was in fact 
only significant for about twenty years after Waterloo. Second, the incidence of the Corn 
Laws after 1828 was, for most years, not as high as has previously been suggested. However, 
some of the years of highest protection occurred after the passing of the reformed sliding 
scale in 1842, a point that has not previously been understood. Third, Britain’s legislative 
movement towards free trade in wheat should be dated from the 1820s rather than the 1840s.  
Fourth, and related to the previous point, the famous repeal of 1846 marked neither the 
beginning nor the end of Britain’s progress towards free trade in grain. 
As previously noted, none of this tells us whether Britain really led the European 
movement towards free trade. However, before 1815 Britain had been very open and, in an 
interesting parallel to later years, she was importing substantial amounts of grain and flour 
from the United States. Thus it was that Napoleon’s Continental System failed to starve 
Britain into submission (Galpin 1922 and 1925). This must surely have been a death blow to 
the traditional argument for European agricultural protection: that it was necessary in order to 
secure a home-grown supply of food in case of war. Britain’s example should have been a 
powerful and convincing one. The lesson took a while to sink in, even for the British, but 
once it did it would help change the world for ever. 
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BPP (1853 to 1903). Annual Statement of Trade and Navigation of United Kingdom with Foreign Countries and 
British Possessions. HCPP 
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 [A] [B] [B/A] [C] [A*C] [D] [D/(A*C)]
Gazette 
Price 
(s./qr.)
Implied 
Duty 
Payable 
(s.)
Schlote 
AVE
Wheat 
imports 
(quarters)
Value of 
imports 
(£)
Duty 
collected 
(£)
Sharp 
AVE
1828 60.42 26.67 44% 748750 2261849 66269 3%
1829 66.25 20.67 31% 1260683 4176013 587645 14%
1830 64.25 22.67 35% 1494382 4800702 493146 10%
1831 66.33 20.67 31% 1088797 3611178 260498 7%
1832 58.67 28.67 49% 166128 487308 193249 40%
1833 52.92 34.67 66% 1144 3027 1124 37%
1834 46.17 40.67 88% 264 609 324 53%
1835 39.33 47.67 121% 48 94 81 86%
1836 48.50 38.67 80% 972 2356 969 41%
1837 55.83 31.67 57% 210254 586959 297545 51%
1838 64.58 22.67 35% 1728453 5581462 134924 2%
1839 70.67 10.67 15% 2521494 8909280 631697 7%
1840 66.33 20.67 31% 2020215 6700379 724106 11%
1841 64.33 22.67 35% 2236153 7192959 384294 5%
1842 57.25 15 26% 2625491 7515467 1107700 15%
1843 50.08 20 40% 843739 2112864 601173 28%
1844 51.25 19 37% 781036 2001405 671033 34%
1845 50.83 20 39% 87701 222908 78344 35%
1846 54.67 4 7% 1903853 5203866 398550 8%
1847 69.75 4 6% 2622086 9144525 2047 0%
1848 50.50 7 14% 1818912 4592752 406935 9%
1849 44.25 1 2% 4450043 9845719 221441 2%
1850 40.25 1 2% 3682273 7410574 187712 3%
1851 38.50 1 3% 3754318 7227063 190714 3%
1852 40.75 1 2% 3013864 6140747 153002 2%
1853 53.25 1 2% 4840909 12888920 247569 2%
1854 72.42 1 1% 3379318 12235948 173140 1%
1855 74.67 1 1% 2627273 9808485 134312 1%
1856 69.17 1 1% 4011136 13871847 205401 1%
1857 56.33 1 2% 3385909 9536977 173770 2%
1858 44.17 1 2% 4177500 9225313 212091 2%
1859 43.75 1 2% 3940227 8619247 199814 2%
1860 53.25 1 2% 5791818 15420716 294178 2%
1861 55.33 1 2% 6808182 18835970 344886 2%
1862 55.42 1 2% 9325909 25840540 472998 2%
1863 44.75 1 2% 5537273 12389648 280870 2%
1864 40.17 1 2% 5272045 10588025 274973 3%
1865 41.83 1 2% 4764318 9965366 262098 3%
1866 49.92 1 2% 5262727 13134890 289340 2%
1867 64.42 1 2% 7874091 25361134 433056 2%
1868 63.75 1 2% 7418182 23645455 407548 2%
1869 48.17 0 0% 8567273 20632848 133059 1%
1870-1901 0% 0%
1902 28.08 1 4% 18409545 25850070 789763 3%
1903 26.75 0 0% 20029773 26789821 456424 2%
1904-1931 0% 0%
Notes:
From 1850 all figures are based on total imports.
Table 3: Schlote and Sharp AVEs
For data sources see appendix.
1828 is from July 15.
Until 1849 all figures are based on foreign wheat released from bond.
